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INTRODUCTION: IDENTIFYING WOMEN AS A "PARTICULAR SOCIAL
GROUP" IN THE REFUGEE JURISPRUDENCE OF CANADA, THE UNITED
STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
For women in refugee law, the issue has always been fitting into the
correct category and thus, bending the category to fit women. I
The difficulties establishing effective legal remedies for gendered harms
and gender inequalities are perhaps nowhere more starkly evident than in
refugee law, where women's appeals for safe refuge from gender
persecution continue to face formidable legal obstacles. In spite of
significant jurisprudential advances in recent years, these obstacles to
women's claims for asylum persist at a time when the world's refugee
crisis is exploding.2 Indeed, the United Nations' Refugee Agency has
recently reported that "the number of refugees, asylum-seekers and
internally displaced people worldwide has, for the first time in the post-
World War II era, exceeded 50 million people.",3 Roughly half of the
world's refugees are women and girls who face particular vulnerabilities
and violations as a result of their gender.4
1. Shauna Labman & Catherine Dauvergne, Evaluating Canada's Approach to
Gender-Related Persecution: Revisiting and Re-Embracing 'Refugee Women and the
Imperative of Categories', in GENDER IN REFUGEE LAW: FROM THE MARGINS TO THE
CENTRE 265 (Efrat Arbel et al. eds., 2014).
2. World Refugee Day: Global Forced Displacement Tops 50 Million For First
Time In Post-World War II Era, UNHCR (June 20, 2014),
http://www.unhcr.org/53a155bc6.html.
3. Id.
4. Valerie Oosterveld, Women and Girls Fleeing Conflict: Gender and the
Interpretation and Application of the 1951 Refugee Convention, UNHCR (Sep. 2012),
available at http://www.unhcr.org/504dd7649.pdf (explaining women and girls who are
refugees from conflict situations "may be subjected to different violations because they
2
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Women become refugees and request asylum for a variety of reasons,
sometimes having little to do with their gender. In this analysis, however, I
focus on women's claims for refuge made on the basis that they have
suffered gender-specific forms of persecution and gendermotivated rights
violations. Gender persecution is expressed in multiple ways - these
include forms of gendered violence, such as physical or sexual violence in
intimate relationships, rape and sexual assault in other relational contexts,
forced marriage, sexual slavery, trafficking for sexual exploitation, female
genital mutilation (FGM), forced veiling, honour killings and other gender
specific cultural or religious practices. All of these forms of gender
persecution simultaneously express and reinforce women's inferior status
and men's dominance in the particular societies in which they occur, and
all can be understood in light of the pervasive and global problem of gender
inequality.5
The foundational statutory definition of a refugee is articulated in the
1951 UN Refugee Convention which recognizes persecution "for reasons
of race, religion, nationality, or membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion .... , But persecution based on the "reason" of gender is
missing from the list.7 It is the very definition of the category of refugee in
the UN Convention, therefore, which does not identify gender as one of the
five protected grounds.
This absence continues in the relevant domestic legislation of Canada,
are women and girls, or they may be subjected to the same type of violations as men
and boys, but experience or perceive these harms in a different manner. One obvious
example is sexual violence committed during war: "[slexual violence, and the long
shadow of terror and trauma it casts, disproportionately affects women and girls." This
different female experience stems from pervasive global gender inequality: around the
world, women and girls tend to be poorer and receive less education, and are often less
mobile as a result of traditional family and caregiving responsibilities, all of which
negatively compound their experiences during conflict. While women and girls may
have common experiences based on their gender, sometimes girls suffer additional
targeted harm as a result of their young age. For example, girls forcibly recruited to
serve as fighters may serve in combat and as scouts (like boys), but may also be
subjected to sexual slavery and conjugal slavery (unlike boys)"); see Women, UNHCR,
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646cld9.html (last visited May 23, 2015).
5. See Gender Inequality Index, UNITED NATIONS' HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMME, http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-inequality-index-gii (last visited
May 23, 2015) (providing data on global gender inequality and identifying gender
inequality as a major barrier to human development); see also Gender Equality and
Statistics, WORLD BANK, http://datatopics.worldbank.org/gender/ (last visited May 23,
2015).
6. See United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28,
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter U.N. Refugee Convention].
7. But see id.
2015]
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the United States, and the United Kingdom, among other refugee-receiving
countries.' Despite years of well-documented problems in the case law of
these major refugee-accepting countries, along with an abundance of
academic commentary analyzing the gender gap defining refugees, 9 this
significant statutory silence on gender has still not been adequately
remedied in any of these states.
There have indeed been important and positive advancements in the
reception of women's asylum claims in many of the main refugee-receiving
countries, including interpretive guidelines allowing adjudicators to be
more gender sensitive in deciding refugee cases. °  Furthermore, the
recognition of rape and domestic violence as forms of gender persecution
and as human rights violations, and an increasing, if uneven, sensitization
to the gender specificities of women's experiences as refugees are welcome
positive change." But a fundamental and persistent problem with the
adjudication of women's gender persecution based refugee claims still lies
in the byzantine set of definitional hurdles imposed by asylum decision
makers trying to fit claimants who have suffered gender persecution into
"particular social groups.' 2 This problem always circles back, in part if
not exclusively, to the failure to name gender as a ground on which the
8. Some countries have explicitly added gender to the statutory definition of
refugee, including South Africa and Ireland.
9. See Helen Baillot, et al., 'Hearing the Right Gaps': Enabling and Responding
to Disclosures of Sexual Violence within the UK Asylum Process, 21 SoC. LEG. STUD.
269, 287 (2012); Karen Musalo, A Short History of Gender Asylum in the United
States: Resistance and Ambivalence May Very Slowly Be Inching Towards
Recognition of Women's Claims, 29 REFUGEE SURV. Q. Nov. 2010, at 46; Michelle
Foster, Why We Are Not There Yet: The Particular Challenge of "Particular Social
Group", in GENDER IN REFUGEE LAW: FROM THE MARGINS TO THE CENTRE 17, 28
(Efrat Arbel et al. eds. 2014); Crystal Doyle, Isn't "Persecution " Enough? Redefining
the Refugee Definition to Provide Greater Asylum Protection to Victims of Gender-
Based Persecution, 15 WASH. & LEE J. CIv. RTS. & SOC. JUST. 519, 530 (2009); Karen
Musalo, Protecting Victims of Gendered Persecution: Fear of Floodgates or Call to
(Principled) Action?, 14 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 119, 119 (2007); Nicole LaViolette,
Gender-Related Refugee Claims: Expanding the Scope of the Canadian Guidelines, 19
INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 169, 174 (2007).
10. Foster, supra note 10, at 29.
11. See Deborah E. Anker, Legal Change from the Bottom Up: The Development
of Gender Asylum Jurisprudence in the United States, in GENDER IN REFUGEE LAW:
FROM THE MARGINS TO THE CENTRE 46 (Efrat Arbel et al. eds. 2014); Musalo, Gender
Asylum, supra note 10, at 46; see also Karen Musalo, A Tale of Two Women: The
Claims for Asylum of Fauziya Kassindja, Who Fled FGC, and Rody Alvarado, a
Survivor of Partner (Domestic) Violence, in GENDER IN REFUGEE LAW: FROM THE
MARGINS TO THE CENTRE 73, 76 (2014).
12. Foster, supra note 10, at 32.
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persecution can be named and recognized.13
Gender's absence as a ground of persecution is obviously not the only
procedural or definitional obstacle to women's asylum claims.14 Among
other problematic elements of the refugee process for women who have
suffered gender persecution, one glaring area of difficulty (among others) is
the set of issues surrounding the analysis of state protection. 5 Adding
gender to the statutory definition of a refugee and recognizing it statutorily
as a ground of persecution is not a panacea, merely a foundational step
forward. As Deborah Anker has persuasively observed, "gender, properly
understood, should pervade the interpretation of every element of the
refugee definition."
' 16
But statutory silence on gender as an enumerated ground of persecution
remains a formidable and persistent initial hurdle. Given that it is an easily
remedied problem it is one that should urgently be addressed and
foregrounded on refugee advocacy and law reform agenda. The various
Guidelines and briefs on gender claims published by immigration
authorities in the major refugee-receiving countries of Canada, the United
Kingdom, and the United States, and all of their attendant policies and
interpretive suggestions, have not come close to fully attenuating this
problem. Instead these guidelines represent only a stopgap, as they are
partial and ineffective solutions that rely on interpretive strategies to get
around the absence of gender as an identified ground. Why must refugee
women's claims for asylum continue to be forced into the conceptual
confusions caused by forcing gender persecution into the straightjacket of
the "particular social group" category?
The conceptual challenges and interpretive resistance that continue to
characterize much of the decision making about women's asylum claims in
the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom exist in the context of
the larger failure in these nations to make persecution based on gender an
explicit statutory ground upon which women can claim refugee status. 17
This refusal to identify the "particular social group" which suffers gender
persecution as simply "women," continues despite the fact that there, is in
each country analyzed here, some jurisprudential authority suggesting that
gender itself, or gender unmodified, can be recognized as the innate
characteristic identifying the persecuted group.18 What is evident in the
13. id.
14. Anker, supra note 12, at 51.
15. Id. at 60-61.
16. Id. at 51.
17. Foster, supra note 9, at 28.
18. See generally id.
2015]
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case law of all of these countries is that the absence of gender as an
enumerated ground of persecution forces decision makers to embark upon a
process of ever more fractured and increasingly narrowed and specific
categories and sub-categories of women who are deemed to be members of
a "particular social group." 19 While decision makers seem more able to
recognize persecution based on religion, or race, or political opinion, in too
many cases they still struggle to grasp the nature of persecution based on
gender.
I argue that this legal absence, in and of itself, represents a state failure
to protect refugee women seeking asylum in these countries. This is also a
failure of each state's purported commitment to gender equality. This
failure persists in Canada, which prides itself as a nation whose identity is
founded upon migration and refugee flows, as well as in other
commonwealth countries such as the United Kingdom, Australia, and New
Zealand. It is perhaps most sharply evident in the United States, where
gender is not only absent as a ground upon which to claim persecution, but
where the requirements of fitting gender asylum claims into the
membership in a "particular social group" category, are arguably the most
detached from the guidance offered by the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),20 and most at odds with more
progressive developments in other jurisdictions.
In this article I critically review some key interpretive developments in
refugee law of Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom relating
to the adjudication of women's claims for asylum based on gender
persecution and point to the difficulties decisions makers still have in
seeing the gender specificity of the persecution. In order to avoid these well
=-documented and persistent taxonomies of gender, to comply with
international human rights norms, and to achieve consistency and justice,
gender must become an independently recognized and identified ground of
persecution in the statutory refugee law of receiving states such as Canada,
the United States, and the United Kingdom. While this is certainly not a
sufficient solution to the multiple barriers too often facing women's gender
persecution asylum claims, it is certainly a necessary and overdue one.
DEFINING "REFUGEE" AND "PERSECUTION" IN LAW
The definition of who qualifies as a refugee in the United Nations'
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, as amended by the 1967
19. Id. at 29.
20. Guidelines on International Protection: "Membership of a Particular Social
Group" Within the Context of Article la(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, UNHCR (May 7, 2002), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/3d58de2da.html.
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Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,2' has been codified in the
Immigration Acts of Canada22 and the United States. 23  The UN
Convention stipulates that a Convention refugee is anyone who:
(a) by reason of a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political
opinion, is
(i) outside the country of the person's nationality and is unable or, by
reason of that fear, is unwilling to avail [her]self of the protection of that
country, or
(ii) not having a country of nationality, is outside the country of the
person's former habitual residence and is unable or, by reason of that
fear, is unwilling to return to that country
24
Refugee claimants must prove a number of essential things to
successfully gain asylum in a refugee-receiving country such as Canada,
the United States, or the United Kingdom." The first, and perhaps most
fundamental, element of the claim is proof of persecution or a well-founded
fear of persecution from which they are unable to receive, or unwilling to
seek state protection in their nation state of origin.26 Persecution contains
two interconnected elements, for the purposes of refugee law: (1) the fear,
threat or experience of the harm (persecution); and (2) the state's inability
or unwillingness to protect the individual from that harm.27
The term "persecution" lacks precise legal content and is not defined in
the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees.28 Indeed, it is a
concept that has resisted clear definition. Persecution is identified in the
21. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Oct. 4, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267,
available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/protocolrefugees.htm [hereinafter
Refugees Protocol] (incorporating the Convention by reference. The Protocol
additionally and significantly removes key restrictions on the definition of refugee
originally imposed in the Convention. In particular the Convention "covers only those
persons who have become refugees as a result of events occurring before I January
1951," a restriction removed by the 1967 Protocol, which also, unlike the 1951
Convention applies "without any geographic limitation.").
22. Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (Can.).
23. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101 (West 2014).
24. U.N. Refugee Convention, art. 1; see Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-2, s.
2(1), art. 33 (Can.), amended by R.S.C. 1985, c. 28, (4th Supp.), s. 1 (Can.).
25. See U.N. Refugee Convention, art. 1.
26. See U.N. Refugee Convention, art. 1 (defining refugee in the context of the
Convention).
27. See id. (alluding to the elements of persecution).
28. See generally id.
2015]
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statutory definitions of "refugee," as a violation of human rights based on a
person's characteristics such as nationality, religion, race, political opinion,
or by virtue of a person's "membership in a particular social group., 29 But
there remains a loud statutory silence on "gender" as an expressly
enumerated ground as the basis for the persecution.
The Supreme Court of Canada defined persecution in the important
Ward v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration)30 decision, as
"sustained or systemic violation of basic human rights demonstrative of a
failure of state protection. 3 1 Paradigmatic forms of persecution based on
gender, including domestic violence and rape, are widely and
uncontroversially recognized in international human rights law as human
rights violations. 32 If persecution, then, is actually the same thing or else
largely equivalent to what constitutes a human rights violation - which
according to Canadian jurisprudence it is - then there is no legitimate
reason for refusing to recognize gender as a ground of persecution.
TRENDS IN THE RECEPTION OF GENDER PERSECUTION REFUGEE CLAIMS IN
CANADA
In Canada, the problem of gender's absence from the listed grounds of
persecution in the definition of a refugee has been addressed by the
introduction of interpretive guidelines on gender. Because the Canadian
Guidelines on "Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related
Persecution 33 have represented such an important development in dealing
with gender persecution in refugee law, and because Canada took a lead in
adopting a more gender-sensitive approach to adjudicating these claims,
some may have labored under the misapprehension that Canadian refugee
law has largely resolved the barriers facing women seeking asylum for
gender-related abuses.34 In fact, Canada has frequently been held as an
29. See id., art. 1.
30. See generally Ward v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 (Can.).
31. Id. at para. 71.
32. See UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, and UN
Human Rights Council, Accelerating Efforts to Eliminate All Forms of Violence
Against Women Preventing and Responding to Rape and Other Forms of Sexual
Violence, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/23/25 (Jun. 25, 2013).
33. Immigration and Refugee Board, Ottawa, Canada, Guidelines Issued by the
Chairperson, Pursuant to Section 65(3) of the Immigration Act: Women Refugee
Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution, 5 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 278 (1993)
[hereinafter Guidelines].
34. See Balser Moussette et al., Female Genital Mutilation and Refugee Status in
the United States-a Step in the Right Direction, 19 B. C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 353,
353 (1996), for an example of academic commentary lauding the Canadian model; see
also Kristine Fox, Gender Persecution: Canadian Guidelines Offer a Model for
8
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example for other countries to follow.
However, upon closer examination, it is clear that the definitional and
interpretive problems which have plagued how legal decision makers
respond to women's gender persecution claims and the ways in which legal
interpretations have resisted accommodating gender as a recognized ground
of persecution have yet to be resolved in the Canadian context. As some
refugee scholars have recently noted, "with the Guidelines in place and
now possessing long-standing familiarity, women's claims are getting
lost... [and] too often fail in their effort to guide gender-sensitive decision
making."35
The Canadian Guidelines and the Recognition of Gender Persecution
The Canadian Guidelines were originally developed to address the gap in
dealing with gender-based refugee claims. 36 The Guidelines emerged in
the aftermath of significant media attention surrounding a few high profile
refugee cases in which women's claims for asylum were rejected, even
though they clearly experienced persecution on the basis of their gender.37
After public attention was drawn to these egregiously decided cases,
consultations were held with refugee and women's advocacy groups, and
the Chair of the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) issued the
Guidelines in 1993, revising them again three years later in 1996.38
Refugee Determination in the United States, 11 ARIZ. J. OF INT'L & COMp. L. 117, 118
(1994); Walter C. Long, Escape from Wonderland: Implementing Canada's Rational
Procedures to Evaluate Women's Gender-Related Asylum Claims, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S
L.J. 179, 189 (1994).
35. Labman & Dauvergne, supra note 2, at 282.
36. Guidelines, supra note 34, at 279.
37. See Jonathan Ferguson, Abuse of Woman 'Really Bad' Valcourt Says of
Refugee Case, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 16, 1992, at A2 (giving the example of a woman
subject to a deportation order forcing her to return to Trinidad where her violent and
abusive husband had also returned so that he could avoid serving a prison sentence in
Canada for repeatedly assaulting her. Her husband had previously been convicted
eleven times in Canada for physical violence perpetrated against her and for his
repeated threats to kill her); see also No. M91-04822, [1991] D.S.S.R. 1096, cited in
"Refugee Women" at 214 (noting that given how low conviction rates are for domestic
violence this is an even more striking situation and illustration of the state's failure to
protect. Another woman's refugee application was denied (although eventually granted
by Ministerial discretion) despite the persecution and harassment to which she had been
subjected in Saudi Arabia for her refusal to wear a veil, as was required in that country
by religious custom and state policy.).
38. See generally Guidelines, supra note 34, at 278; see also Women Refugee
Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution: Update, IMMIGR. AND REFUGEE BD.
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The documented inability or refusal of adjudicators to fit gender-based
claims within the statutory framework regulating the admission of refugees
was the central issue the Guidelines sought to address.39 The Guidelines
allow IRB decision makers to define the category of refugee in a way that
more fully and sensitively accounts for the particularities of women's
gender-specific experiences of persecution.40  The Guidelines also
specifically instruct IRB adjudicators about ways to accommodate the
claims of women who have been persecuted because they have
transgressed the gendered social or religious mores of their nation states. 4'
Furthermore, the Guidelines are significant for the claims of women who
seek asylum based on persecution in the form of domestic violence.42 In
both of these examples, the Guidelines incorporate a much-needed
recognition of the specific forms of persecution to which women are often
subjected due to their gender.
The Guidelines also outline principles of statutory interpretation to assist
with the recognition of gender-specific persecution and, when they were
first introduced, they were accompanied by the provision of additional
training to IRB adjudicators in how to apply the Guidelines' interpretive
principles.43 The Canadian Guidelines, therefore, enable adjudicators to
take gender into account, by allowing for the possibility of granting asylum
to women who can prove that their claims are based on experiences of
gender persecution, can demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution
from which they can not receive state protection in their home countries,
and whose experiences of persecution can be linked to one or more of the
Gender Guidelines]; and Nurjehan Mawani, Introduction to the Immigration and
Refugee Board Guidelines on Gender-Related Persecution, 5 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 240,
241 (1993).
39. Fox, supra note 35, at 118.
40. See generally Guidelines, supra note 34.
41. See id. at 283-84. This is one of the more potentially radical aspects of the
Guidelines, insofar as it allows for a legal framing of an individual woman's resistance
to patriarchal norms and practices, and the punishment she receives for this resistance,
as the basis for a persecution claim. In this way, and in specific contexts meeting all of
the definitional requirements, the Guidelines potentially legitimate a woman's
resistance to gender oppression, by conferring refugee status as an escape from that
very oppression.
42. See Constance Macintosh, Domestic Violence and Gender-Based Persecution:
How Refugee Adjudicators Justice Women Seeking Refuge from Spousal Violence-and
Why Reform is Needed, 26 REFUGEE 147, 148 (2010); Efrat Arbel, The Culture of
Rights Protection in Canadian Refugee Law: Examining the Domestic Violence Cases,
58 McGILL L.J. 729, 731 (2013) (discussing analyses of some of the Canadian
decisions on domestic violence and refugee protection).
43. See Guidelines, supra note 34, at 283.
10
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already enumerated grounds of persecution (religion, nationality, race,
political opinion, or membership in a particular social group).44 In the
absence of recognizing gender as its own ground of persecution this
approach is supposed to be more sensitive to women's claims of gender
persecution, by accommodating them within the theoretically and
empirically vexing category of "membership in a particular social group."
However, the Canadian Guidelines do not go far enough, as they do not
advocate for adding gender as an independent ground upon which a claim
of persecution can be made within the statutory definition of a refugee.45
Instead, they direct IRB decision makers to determine "the linkage between
gender, the feared persecution and one or more of the already existing
definition grounds. ' 46 In this way, it is important to recognize that the
Guidelines, while representing significant progress in Canada's
accommodation of women's asylum claims based on gender persecution,
are also an inherently limited remedy insofar as they are administrative
directives that only reflect a policy statement of interpretive possibility and
not a definitive definitional legal shift. They are not, in other words, "hard
law." The Guidelines merely serve as an interpretive device, providing
what Audrey Macklin describes as, "advice on gender sensitive approaches
to statutory interpretation, 47 and the focus of the interpretation begins with
what constitutes a "particular social group." They merely represent a
partial solution when a more complete one is both possible and necessary.
Ward v. Canada and the Nascent Recognition of Gender as the "Particular
Social Group"
Released only a few months after the Canadian Guidelines, the Canadian
Supreme Court rendered its judgment in Ward v. Canada (Minister of
Employment and Immigration)4 which remains foundational in terms of
providing interpretive direction and clarification on identifying a fear
persecution, the absence of state protection, and on theorizing the contours
of what constitutes a "particular social group" in Canadian refugee law. In
obiter comments on how membership in a particular social group should be
defined, Justice La Forest lends credence to the view that gender in and of
itself can be an independent ground on which a claim of persecution can be
founded.49 While the facts in Ward dealt with a claim for refugee status
44. See id. at 286.
45. See generally id.
46. Id. at 279.
47. Audrey Macklin, Refugee Women and the Imperative of Categories, 17 HuM.
RTS. Q. 213, 221 (1995).
48. Ward v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 (Can.).
49. Id. at para. 78.
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made by a man threatened with death by the Irish National Liberation
Army (INLA), a paramilitary organization in which he had been involved
but from which he defected, Justice La Forest's judgment engages in a
wide-ranging consideration of issues highly pertinent to refugee claims,
including the state's relationship to persecution, which is analyzed more
fully below, and the range of the category of "social group."5°
In delineating the proper approach to defining a particular social group,
Justice La Forest draws on anti-discrimination principles and Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms51 jurisprudence, clearly a progressive
move for refugee law.5 2 Drawing on these frameworks and on previous
case law, he identifies three possible categories to assign meaning to
"particular social group." These are:
groups defined by an innate or unchangeable characteristic;
groups whose members voluntarily associate for reasons so fundamental
to their human dignity that they should not be forced to foresake the
association; and
groups associated by a former voluntary status, unalterable due to its
historical permanence.53
According to Justice La Forest, the first of these explicitly embraces
"individuals fearing persecution on such bases as gender. . . ,54 Of
particular significance is that Justice La Forest mentions gender as its own
category, not defined in relation to anything else or modified in terms of
any other characteristic. This dictum from the Supreme Court of Canada
suggests that the IRB can dispense with the need to identify a gender sub-
group within the gendered group of women. As Macklin points out, "[t]o
the extent that Ward contemplates gender as a category, it may be that this
aspect of the Guidelines has been effectively superseded by the dictum of
the Supreme Court of Canada., 55 Certainly IRB decision makers should
have been inspired to move beyond the categorical constraints of the
approach of the Guidelines. Encouraged by this Supreme Court of Canada
dictum, adjudicators clearly could and should have stretched the borders of
the category of membership in a particular social group further to allow for
recognition of women as a social group. Yet they have not taken up this
50. See generally id.
51. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982
(U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].
52. See Ward, 2 S.C.R. at para. 23.
53. Id. at para. 78.
54. Id.
55. Macklin, supra note 48, at 247.
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Some Key Cases and Their Significance
In the Canadian refugee case law there have some positive legal
developments in recent years with regard to claims based on gender
persecution. One significant legal development is the judicial recognition
of rape and sexual assault as largely gendered crimes. This has long been
recognized in sexual assault case law at the Supreme Court of Canada 6 but
has been a more vexed issue at the decision-making level of the tribunals of
the Immigration and Refugee Board, where rape has sometimes been
mischaracterized as a "common crime," similarly affecting men and
women. However, an appellate court in Dezameau v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration),5 7 has clearly linked gender and rape, and has
identified the significantly higher vulnerability women have to this
particular crime (which is overwhelmingly committed by men) and how
this can factor into a refugee claim based on gender persecution.
In 2007, Elmancia Dezameau, a woman from Haiti made a claim for
refugee status, had her claim initially denied by the IRB but succeeded after
an appeal on judicial review to the Federal Court of Canada.58 The
decision is especially important because one of the legal errors made by the
original board that heard her case was the failure to recognize rape as a
gendered crime. 59 As the Federal Court explained in rejecting the initial
decision, the Board erred "in law and with respect to the facts, in finding
that rape is not a gender-related risk in Haiti or that rape is a general risk
faced by all Haitians., 60  Put differently, the Federal Court of Canada
clearly identified rape as a gendered crime "grounded in the status of
women in society.
' 61
Another positive and important relatively recent development in the
Canadian refugee case law is the recognition of domestic violence as a
human rights violation and a form of gender persecution.6 2  The
56. See R. v. McCraw, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 72, 83-84; see also R. v. Ewanchuk, [1999]
1 S.C.R. 330, paras. 25-26 (Can.); Non-Marine Underwriters, Lloyd's of London v.
Scalera, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 551,120 (Can.).
57. See generally Dezameau v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) [2010] 1
F.C. 559 (Can.).
58. Id. atpara. 1.
59. Id. atpara. 10.
60. Id. at para. 41.
61. Id. at paras. 34-35.
62. See Macintosh, supra note 43, at 152. See Narvaez v. Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), [1995] 2 FCR 55 for judicial recognition that women
facing domestic violence were recognized as a particular social group for purposes of
2015]
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significance for the definition of a refugee is that women who are victims
of domestic violence and seek asylum on this basis can have their claims
recognized as representing gender persecution, forming a nexus to a
convention ground. This recognition of domestic violence as gender
persecution minimizes the vexing definitional issues surrounding tying the
gender-based persecution to a "particular social group," because
unprotected women suffering domestic abuse can be recognized as the
"particular social group," a welcome and important form of progress.
According to Constance MacIntosh, this development in the case law "is an
extremely positive one to document. It suggests that domestic violence-
like forced prostitution, or state-sanctioned rape-has passed the
conceptual threshold where its repugnance to fundamental human rights
could still be debated., 63 It also suggests, in theory at least, that the
recognition of gender persecution in the form of rape or domestic violence
also recognizes an obvious violation of the claimant's human rights.
But a recent academic review and analysis of reported decisions that
reached judicial review in Canada has shown that this apparently important
shift in the refugee jurisprudence, however, has been uneven at best. Based
on an analysis of 528 gender persecution refugee claims made by women
who experienced domestic violence, Efrat Arbel finds that the recognition
of domestic violence as a human rights violation was absent in most of the
judgments issued by decision makers.64 As she notes, "adjudicators rarely
identified domestic violence as a rights violation in itself."65  This
demonstrates the disconnect between theory and practice in this aspect of
refugee law and gender persecution claims.
Assuming that the obstacle of the ground and identification of a
"particular social group" is overcome in an asylum claim, the legal analysis
shifts to the question of the "adequacy" of the state protection available to
the asylum seeker, an area posing its own set of complications and
challenges, and warranting its own analysis (not undertaken here).66 In
other words, even in those cases in which the positive development
recognizing domestic violence as a form of gender persecution is met, it is
not necessarily the case that a claim made on this basis is more likely to be
accepted. Indeed, and to the contrary, one study suggested extremely high
an asylum claim based on gender persecution.
63. Id. at 153.
64. See Arbel, supra note 43, at 729.
65. See id. at 748.
66. See Melanie Randall, Refugee Law and State Accountability for Violence
Against Women: A Comparative Analysis of Legal Approaches to Asylum Claims
based on Gender Persecution, 25 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 281, 317 (2002); see also
MacIntosh, supra note 43, at 147.
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rejection rates of these types of claims in Canada, rejections that are
overwhelmingly upheld on review. 67 A more recent and larger study of
refugee domestic violence cases decided on appeal in Canada reports that
the majority of the appeals, about 80%, were denied, while only about 20%
had positive outcomes ("refugee admissions or successful appeals").68 The
positive development of recognizing domestic violence as a human rights
violation and as gender persecution has not always been carried through in
the Canadian case law.
Particularizing Social Groups: Modifying Gender
Of greatest significance for the purposes of this analysis of definitional
issues in gender persecution claims is the fact that domestic violence is
consistently recognized as a form of persecution for a claim for asylum,
even if the recognition is incomplete in terms of foregrounding the human
rights violation it entails. In fact, "the survey of RPD decisions revealed no
cases where the claim was denied on the basis that the alleged domestic
violence did not constitute persecution., 69  So while the question of
"particular social group" is closer to being resolved given the identification
of domestic violence as gender persecution, other kinds of gender-based
harms from which women flee and seek asylum in Canada, continue to
pose the same taxonomic absurdities posed by the "particular social group"
analysis.
Examples of constructed sub-divisions of gender in Canadian case law
include "single women suffering from abuse at hands of former spouses
who have been forced into prostitution, 7° women "married according to
traditional Yoruba custom, 71 "women in Pakistan in forced marriages,,
72
67. Macintosh, supra note 43, at 152 (noting that research, based on a review of
135 reported decisions pertaining to domestic violence gender persecution claims,
revealed an astonishing rejection rate of between 98% and 100% of claims in the five
years studied, 2004-2009. The largest reason for rejected claims was difficulties in
proof that home state could not protect, followed by a finding that the story of domestic
violence was not found to be credible by the adjudicator. In describing the sample of
available reported decisions available for review Macintosh observes that the study: "is
limited to those decisions that were reported in the LexisNexis Quicklaw database.
LexisNexis Quicklaw does not report all decisions of the RPD, but it does include a
pool of decisions that is considerably larger than those which CIC posts in RefLex,
their public and searchable online database.").
68. Arbel, supra note 43, at 746.
69. MacIntosh, supra note 43, at 153.
70. See D.J.P., Re [1999] C.R.D.D. No. 155.
71. See O.E.X., Re [1999] C.R.D.D. No. 68.
72. F.Z.A., Re [2000] C.R.D.D. No. 139.
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"Trinidadian women subject to wife abuse, 73 "women in El Salvador
abused by a perceived partner, a rebuffed ex-boyfriend, ' '74 "young, female,
rural Fujianese, ' 75 and "a family including two minor children led by a
single parent female with serious mental health problems, in a country with
serious social and economic problems with a documented negative effect
on women and children."
76
In Cornejo v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration)7 7 decided
in 2010, the refugee claimant identified that she belonged to a "particular
social group" consisting of "women who [become] pregnant out of
marriage and whose family belongs to the Way., 78 Other examples of
"particular social groups" include, "women living without male support in
Sri Lanka,, 79 "single women who were trafficked in Ethiopia," 80 "Tamil
woman subjected to domestic violence and the wife of an alleged child
molester," 8' a "battered woman, [who] is unable or, by reason of that fear,
unwilling to avail herself of the protection of her homeland, Pakistan," 82
"women in a vulnerable position in Guyana subjected to fear for lives
because of adult child's threats against them to obtain money," 83 "women
alone without a male head, ' 84 "educated, wealthy Roma women who
challenge power structure,"85 and finally, "vulnerable Tamil woman from
Jaffna, preyed upon by the Tamil militants and the Sri Lankan security
forces. 86
73. Canada v. Meyers (1992), [1993] 1 F.C. 154 [hereinafter Meyers]. This case, it
should be pointed out, was decided shortly before the release of the Guidelines, but the
Guidelines do not remedy the problem of sub-classification which appeared in Meyers.
Instead, they underscore it. In other words, because the Guidelines do not recognize
that gender can itself constitute the social group facing persecution, the same
taxonomic problem persists in which increasingly narrow sub-groups of women
sharing specific characteristics are identified as the relevant and persecuted social
groupings.
74. Q.A.E., Re. [2000] C.R.D.D. No. 85.
75. Zheng v. Canada, 2002 FCT 448 (Can.).
76. K.B.A., Re [2001] C.R.D.D. No. 56.
77. Comejo v. Canada, 2010 FC 261 (Can.).
78. See id. (explaining "The Way" describes a fundamentalist Catholic Christian
Sect.).
79. Kamalendran v. Canada, 2006 FC 393 (Can.).
80. X., Re 2006 CarswellNat 4089, at para. 2 (Can. F.T.C.D.) (WL).
81. Swaminathan v. Canada, 2007 FC 86 (Can.).
82. Khan v. Canada, 2005 FC 139 (Can.).
83. Dannett v. Canada, 2006 FC 1363, para. 8 (Can.).
84. Roberts v. Canada, 2007 FC 796, para. 27 (Can.).
85. Florea v. Canada, 2005 F.C. 1472, para. 1 (Can.).
86. Kathirgamu v. Canada, 2005 F.C. 300, para. 4 (Can.).
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In the early 1990s in Canada, numerous committees were created by the
government to study the issue of gender and refugee claims and to offer
advice on reform to eliminate the problems in receiving and interpreting
women's asylum cases.87 In 2001, the National Association of Women and
the Law (NAWL) in Canada recommended "the refugee definition be
amended to formally include gender in its own right." 88 Despite much
lobbying, advocacy and scholarly discussion over the years pertaining to
the continuing problems processing women's refugee claims based on
gender persecution, the Canadian government's record on dealing
effectively with gender persecution claims in the asylum process can at best
be described as poor and neglectful. Constance Macntosh has observed
that the decision not to enumerate gender as a protected ground was an
explicit one, based on the conviction that the Guidelines would provide a
sufficient corrective to the documented problems. 89 But as Macntosh
correctly observes, this decision not to recognize gender is inconsistent
with the positions that Canada has taken in other contexts, where we have
voluntarily and proudly explicitly bound ourselves by law to protecting
women against wrongful treatment on the basis of their gender. For
example, this commitment is reflected within the terms of our constitution
and in both federal and provincial laws.90
The Canadian government has had ample opportunity over many, many
years to bring refugee law in line with the Canadian constitutional
guarantee of equality 9' (which significantly applies to non citizens) by
adding gender as an enumerated ground of persecution. It has so far
neglected to do so. This represents a significant state failure in Canada to
deliver on an explicit commitment to gender equality, and a failure to live
up to its international law obligations for women's equal rights.
87. See LaViolette, supra note 10, at 174.
88. NAT'L Ass'N OF WOMEN & THE LAW, Brief on the Proposed Immigration and
Refugee Protection Act (Bill C-11), 27 (2001). The NAWL also recommended that if
the government declined to recognize gender in its own right it should then be included
as part of a larger open ended list of social groups. NAWL also recommended that
'social group' should be defined in Bill C-31 as explicitly including gays and lesbians.
Other reports were subsequently submitted to the Canadian government about gender
issues in the Canadian asylum process including, CATHERINE DAUVERGNE, ET AL.,
GENDERING CANADA'S REFUGEE PROCESS (2006).
89. Macintosh, supra note 43, at 149.
90. Id.
91. Constitution Act, being Schedule B, Part 1 to the Canada At, 1982, c. 11
(U.K.) (guaranteeing gender equality (as well as equality on other enumerated and
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TRENDS IN GENDER PERSECUTION CLAIMS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
In the 1980s the European Parliament passed a resolution urging member
states to recognize women refugee claimants who rejected the cultural,
religious or social norms of their originating societies, as belonging to a
"particular social group. 92 Despite this positive beginning, a 2012 review
of law, policies, and practices in Europe pertaining to gender related
asylum claims93 suggests that "there are vast and worrying disparities in the
way different EU States handle gender-related asylum claims." As a result
of these inconsistencies across EU states, the authors of this analysis
concluded that "women are not guaranteed anything close to consistent,
gender-sensitive treatment when they seek protection in Europe. Women
seeking asylum are too often confronted with legislation and policy that fail
to meet acceptable standards, while even gender-sensitive policies are not
implemented in practice. '94 The United Kingdom's record exemplifies this
broader European trend.
The United Kingdom is one of the few member states of the European
Union to have issued gender-specific refugee guidelines to assist decision
makers in adjudicating gender-based refugee claims.95 The Guidelines,
entitled, "Gender Issues in the Asylum Process," describe what kinds of
gender persecution fit the grounds for asylum and recognize that some
forms of persecution are gender specific, including "rape and other forms
of sexual violence, domestic violence, crimes in the name of honor, female
genital mutilation (FGM), forced abortion and sterilization." 96 The
Guidelines further stress the importance of considering the gender-related
aspects of a refugee claim to help "ensure that all aspects of a claim are
92. Resolution on the Application of the Geneva Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees, O.J. 1984 (C127) 137.
93. Hana Cheikh Ali et al., Gender Related Asylum Claims in Europe: A
Comparative Analysis of Law, Policies and Practice Focusing on Women in Nine EU
Member States (2012), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4fc74d342.html.
94. Id. at 7-8.
95. Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim, UNITED KINGDOM VISAS AND
IMMIGRATION (2011), available at
http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/asylumpolicy
instructions/apis/gender-issue-in-the-asylum.pdf?view=Binary.
96. Id. at 5. The Guidelines further stipulate that: There are many forms of harm
that are more frequently or only used against women. These can occur in the family,
the community, or at the hands of the State. They include, but are not limited to:
marriage-related harm (e.g. forced marriage); violence within the family or community
(e.g. honor killings); domestic slavery; forced abortion; forced sterilization forced
prostitution; trafficking; female genital mutilation; sexual violence and abuse; or rape.
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fully and fairly considered., 97 However, the case law from the U.K.
suggests an ongoing failure by the U.K. Board to assiduously follow and
properly implement their guidelines on gender issues in asylum claims.
The U.K. Border Agency defines "particular social group" in terms of
innate or immutable characteristics, which may include: "gender, age,
marital status, religion, family and kinship, past economic status/class,
occupational history, disability, sexual history, sexual orientation and
ethnic, tribal or clan affiliation. 98 This is consistent with the framing of
membership in a "particular social group" as necessarily related to an
"immutable characteristic," as was set out in the two important companion
British refugee decisions, Shah and Islam.
Some Key United Kingdom Cases and Their Significance
These two decisions, Islam v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department and R. v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Secretary of State
for the Home Department ex parte Shah, centered on the claims of
Pakistani women who had been subjected to violence by their husbands. In
each case, the women had been accused by their husbands of having
committed adultery, thereby transgressing "Islamic mores." 99 The women
were both physically abused and compelled by their husbands to leave their
homes.'00 In criminal proceedings under Sharia law, these women would,
had they been found guilty, have been subject to "flogging or stoning to
death."' 0 '
The women's claims for political asylum in Britain were initially denied.
The rejection was based on a finding that, as a matter of law, the claimants
did not belong to a "particular social group."'0 2  That the women had
suffered gender persecution was not disputed. Nor was the state's failure to
protect these women contested. 0 3 The major issue in the appeals instead
97. Id. at 3.
98. Id. at 11.
99. See Islam v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't [1999] 2 A.C. 629 (H.L.)
(appeal taken from Eng.); see also R. v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Sec'y of
State for the Home Dep't ex parte Shah (Conjoined Appeals) [1999] 2 W.L.R. 1015;
decisions published in International Journal of Refugee Law 11 (1999) 496-527, at 496
[hereinafter cited to this source].
100. Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim, UNITED KINGDOM VISAS AND
IMMIGRATION (2011), available at
http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/asylumpolicy
instructions/apis/gender-issue-in-the-asylum.pdf?view=Binary.
101. id. at 1.
102. Id. at 3.
103. Women in Pakistan: Disadvantaged and Denied Their Rights, AMNESTY INT'L,
available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a9fbl8.html (last visited May 11,
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revolved around the pivotal question of how their claims fit into the
"membership in a social group" category, legally recognized and protected
by the Convention.
On appeal the House of Lords rejected the lower court's finding that
because there was no common uniting attribute to satisfy the requirement
of cohesiveness, the women could not be recognized as members of a
"particular social group" within the meaning of the Convention. 0 4 To the
contrary, and in an important and welcome development, the Law Lords
found that the women did in fact belong to a "particular social group,"
though they had distinct approaches to how precisely that group was
defined (and they divided four to one on the question). 0 5 Three Law Lords
accepted the validity of "women in Pakistan" as constituting the "particular
social group," while one Law Lord found the group to be narrower,
constituted by "women in Pakistan accused of adultery."'0 6 Gender was the
basis of the "particular social group," though it was gender described in
combination with other attributes.
The House of Lords decision is significant for its explicit and sustained
analysis of gender as the fundamental basis of the oppression and
persecution the claimants in these cases suffered. The legal reasoning in
Islam and Shah was also characterized by a broad and purposive approach
to interpreting the Convention. As Lord Hoffmann opined, "the concept of
social group is in my view perfectly adequate to accommodate women as a
group in a society that discriminates on grounds of sex, that is to say, that
perceives women as not being entitled to the same fundamental rights as
men." 0 7 This kind of legal analysis promised potentially expansive results,
namely, the recognition that gender discrimination could be explicitly
foregrounded in refugee law, and even that gender might itself be
recognized as the ground of persecution.
The recognition of gender as the basis for membership in a "particular
social group" was also confirmed in a subsequent pair of important
2015).
104. Islam, [1999] 2 A.C. at 4.
105. In fact, one commentator notes that one of the fascinating aspects of this
judgment is that, their differences aside, the majority based their decision "on a
reasoning which was wider than that which the appellants (understandably, given the
stance of the Court of Appeal) dared to advance." Sue Kirvan, Note, Women and
Asylum: A Particular Social Group 7 FEMINIST LEGAL STUDIES, 333, 336 (1999).
106. Id. at 335. The dissenting Law Lord agreed with the majority on some of the
fundamental issues regarding the interpretation of the Convention but not in their
application to facts of these cases. Instead, Lord Millet argued that in these cases
"particular social group" did not exist independently of the persecution suffered.
107. Islam, [1999] 2 A.C. at 16.
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decisions issued by the House of Lords in 2006. In these cases, often
referred to simply as Fornah, the UK's highest court made clear that it
adopted the UNHCR's approach to gender according to which "sex can
properly be within the ambit of the social group category, with women
being a clear example of a social subset defined by innate and immutable
characteristics, and who are frequently treated differently to men."' 0 8 The
House of Lords further indicated that a "particular social group" is defined
either by the social perception approach, in which the "particular social
group" is distinguished from the rest of society, or by the protected
characteristic approach, which is when the group is characterized by an
immutable characteristic, or a characteristic fundamental to their human
dignity.0 9
It is in the decision involving Ms. Fornah's asylum claim that the House
of Lords provided extensive reasons on the analysis of whether or not the
persecution could be based on her membership in a "particular social
group.,"110 Ms. Fornah fled Sierra Leone, after having been raped and made
pregnant, because she feared persecution in the form of FGM, a practice
performed "on the overwhelming majority of girls in Sierra Leone.""' Ms.
Fornah's claim was accepted by the House of Lords and, though their
various reasons differed about how precisely to define the group, the Lords
all agreed that her claim for gender persecution in the form of FGM fit into
the category of membership in a "particular social group." In fact,
Baroness Hale of Richmond went so far as to observe in apparent
exasperation that, "the answer in each case is so blindingly obvious that it
must be a mystery to some why either of them had to reach this House." "
2
All of the Lords found that FGM is a form of gender persecution and
found that Ms. Fornah's risk of being subject to it put her in a "particular
social group" requiring protection, though some Lords framed the group
108. Fornah v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2006] UKHL 46, para. 12
(U.K.).
109. Id.
110. Id. at paras. 4, 6. In the prior proceedings, the Secretary of State for the Home
Department accepted that Ms. Fornah was credible and that she would be subjected to
inhuman and degrading treatment if she was returned to Sierra Leone, and granting her
protection under Art 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The applicant
appealed on the basis that she should be recognized as a refugee. By a majority the
Court of Appeal found that the applicant had not established that she was a member of
a particular social group. The practice of FGM in Sierra Leone was not discriminatory
in a way that set those who are subjected to it apart from others in society and that
FGM could not be used as the defining characteristic of the particular social group
because it was inseparable from the persecution feared.
111. Id.
112. Id. atpara. 83.
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more narrowly than others. Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, for example, found
that "the appellant belongs to the group of uninitiated intact women who
face persecution by enforced mutilation," ' 13 while Lord Hope of Craighead
opined "one can say, with greater precision, that the particular social group
is composed of uninitiated indigenous females in Sierra Leone."
' 14
Significantly, in the decision a number of the Lords expressly found that
gender itself was the basis for the social group and the persecution. Lord
Bingham opined that he found "no difficulty in recognizing women in
Sierra Leone as a particular social group for purposes of article 1A(2)" of
the UNHCR Convention." 15 Baroness Hale states that it "was never in
dispute that the harm which these two women feared was sufficiently
serious to amount to persecution," and "in each case it was either wholly or
partly gender-specific." '" 16 According to Baroness Hale, if a woman is
persecuted because she is a woman in a country where women are assigned
an inferior status, this is sufficient to engage the Refugee Convention
without further sub-classification. Finally, Lord Brown of Easton-Under-
Heywood writes that "I do not disagree with Lord Bingham and Baroness
Hale that the group could if necessary be more widely defined to include
even the initiated on the basis that all Sierra Leonean women suffer
discrimination and subjugation of which the practice of FGM constitutes
merely an extreme and ghastly manifestation."
' 17
Particularizing Social Groups: Modifying Gender in the United Kingdom
Case Law
In the important House of Lords judgment in Fornah, Lord Rodger of
Earlsferry also made a clear statement that gender can form the "particular
social group" in refugee law.
There is no doubt, of course, that all the women in a given society can
comprise a particular social group for purposes of the Convention. That
was settled by the decision of the House in R v Secretary of State for the
Home Department, Ex p Shah. "
8
But after the apparent conceptual advance of recognizing the persecution
of the group of women qua women, came the immediate qualification and
113. Id. at para. 80.
114. Id. at para. 56.
115. Id. at 31.
116. Id. at47.
117. Id. at 119.
118. Id. at 76, per Lord Rodger of Earlsferry [Emphasis Added].
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... [T]here is no particular virtue in defining the group so widely. Of
course, persecution for reasons of membership of that group equates to
persecution for reasons of gender - which slots easily into the sequence
of race, religion, nationality and political opinion. But, even if there is
widespread discrimination against women in various aspects of life in
Sierra Leone, that is not in itself a sufficient reason to overlook the true,
more specific, reason for the persecution of these intact women.119
The decision in Fornah seemed to suggest, Lord Rodgers' equivocations
aside, that UK asylum law would recognize persecution based on gender
without resorting to the repeated fracturing and unnecessary
particularization of categories of "particular social groups" in various
national and social contexts. That promise, however, remains unfulfilled.
In stark contrast to the direction signaled by the majority of the House of
Lords in Fornah, a range of highly specialized sub-categories of women
have been constructed in the subsequent UK case law, including, for
example, "particular social groups" such as "women in the Ivory Coast,"12
"women charged with committing adultery in Pakistan,"' 2 1 "women in
Liberia belonging to those ethnic groups where FGM is practiced,"'
' 22
"women (at risk of FGM) in Sudan," '123 "lesbian women in Albania,"'
124
"former victims of trafficking in Moldova,"'' 25 "former victims of
trafficking in Thailand,' 126 "former victims of trafficking in China,"'
127
"former victims of trafficking in Albania,"1 28 "young Iranian women who
refuse to enter into arranged marriages, 1 29 and finally, "women who do not
conform to the heterosexual narrative and are perceived as lesbians in
119. Id.
120. MD (Women) Ivory Coast CG, [2010] UKUT 215,282 (tAC) (U.K.).
121. KA and Others (domestic violence - risk on return) Pakistan CG, [2010]
UKUT 216, 243 (IAC) (U.K.).
122. SK (FGM- ethnic groups) Liberia CG, [2007] UKAIT 1, 69 (U.K.).
123. FM(FGM) Sudan CG, [2007] UKAIT 60, 145 (U.K.).
124. MK (Lesbians) Albania CG, [2009] UKAIT 36, 352 (U.K.).
125. SB (PSG - Protection Regulations - Reg 6) Moldova CG, [2008] UKAIT 2,
112 (U.K.).
126. AZ (Trafficked women) Thailand CG, [2010] UKUT 118, 139 (IAC) (U.K.).
127. HC & RC (Trafficked women) China CG, [2009] UKAIT 27, 92 (U.K.).
128. AM and BM (Trafficked women) Albania CG, [2010] UKUT 80, 166 (IAC)
(U.K.).
129. TB (PSG- women) Iran, [2005] UKIAT 65, 69 (U.K.).
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Furthermore, research over almost the last decade has shown the failure
by the UK Board to properly implement and follow their guidelines on
Gender.' 31 For example, recent research conducted on the UK asylum
process has found that, whereas the average overturn rate of all refugee
cases is 27%, for cases for asylum brought by women 42% of initial
refusals were overturned at the appeal tribunal (Asylum Aid, 2011). This
differential suggests that something problematic is at play in the
adjudication of women's asylum claims. A report produced by the
Women's Project, at the NGO in the UK called Asylum Aid, finds that "the
UKBA and the Tribunal's interpretation of the Convention ground of a
particular social group which is not in accordance with the House of Lords'
decision in Fornah results in a discriminatory approach to asylum claims
based on the Convention ground of particular social group where the group
is defined by gender and fails to ensure that protection is granted to those
who have a well-founded fear of persecution because of their gender.
1 32
In the absence of gender being recognized as a ground of persecution, the
interpretive barriers surrounding the articulation of membership in a
"particular social group" and the sub-classifications this seems to have
necessitated will continue to impede access to justice for women who flee
from gendered harms and seek asylum in the UK. Clearly gender needs to
be recognized as its own ground of persecution to move past this recurring
barrier.
TRENDS IN GENDER PERSECUTION REFUGEE CLAIMS IN THE UNITED
STATES
In 1995, the U.S. Department of Justice issued Considerations for
Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims from Women, 133 a document
intended to provide an interpretive aid for asylum officers who are the
initial decision makers for refugee claims made within the United States.
The Considerations state that gender claims should be assessed within "the
130. SW (lesbians - HJ and HT applied) Jamaica CG, [2011] UKUT 251, 99(IAC)
(U.K.).
131. See UNITED KINGDOM VISAS AND IMMIGRATION, supra note 69.
132. Christel Querton, "I Feel Like as a Woman I am Not Welcome": A Gender
Analysis of UK Asylum Law, Policy and Practice, 53 (2012), available at
http://www.asylumaid.org.uk/data/files/ifeelasawoman reportv2.pdf.
133. Memorandum from Phyllis Coven, U.S. Dep't. of Justice, Considerations for
Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims from Women, (May 26, 1995), available
at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b31 e7.html.
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framework provided by existing international human rights instruments"'' 34
and that political opinion or membership in a "particular social group" are
the possible grounds for asylum claims based on gender persecution. But
as is evident in the Canadian and the British refugee jurisprudence, the
same troubling classification phenomenon pertains in the U.S. case law
with regard to "particular social groups," which have been continuously
defined in narrow and individualized terms.
An early and important U.S. decision should have mapped out for
immigration decision makers the route of finding gender itself as the basis
of a "particular social group." In In re Acosta,' 35 the U.S. Board of
Immigration Appeals 36 (BIA) found that membership in a "particular
social group" was based on a "common immutable characteristic," which
might be innate, as "sex, color, or kinship ties," or might be a "shared past
experience such as military leadership or land ownership." This significant
decision in U.S. refugee law showed a promise of doctrinal progression and
expansion with regard to legal definitions of "particular social group,"
especially in recognizing gender as the basis of this category. This
promise, however, is still unrealized in the asylum jurisprudence in the U.S.
in the decades since that encouraging judgment.
Recognizing that the content of the "particular social group" category
would necessarily be filled in on a "case-by-case basis," the BIA in Acosta
acknowledged that the constitution of a "particular social group," therefore,
could be circumstantially specific, as in a shared experience or voluntary
status that unites group members. More significantly, however, the legal
reasoning in Acosta expressly allowed for recognition that a "particular
social group" can be organized around fundamental characteristics essential
to a person's identity, which obviously includes such fundamental
attributes as gender. However, a review of key cases reveals that the
radical potential of this recognition that gender can form the basis of a
"particular social group" has not been realized in subsequent U.S. case law
relating to women's refugee claims arising out of experiences of gender
persecution. In fact, after the step forward Acosta represented, there have
been multiple steps backwards.
Decided after Acosta, the U.S. decision in In Re Kasinga137 has also been
hailed as an interpretive breakthrough because it explicitly recognized that
134. Id. at 2.
135. In re Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211,233 (B.I.A. 1985) [hereinafter Acosta].
136. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) is an administrative tribunal
mandated to review the decisions of immigration Justices in hearings to determine
whether or not a ease for asylum in the U.S. has been successfully made out.
137. In re Kasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357, 377 (B.1.A. 1996) [hereinafter Kasinga].
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gender can be a component of the "particular social group" category.
38
But the judicial reasoning underpinning this finding suffers from the same
restricted and compartmentalized approach to gender that has characterized
the Canadian and British case law. In Kasinga, the applicant for asylum,
Fauziya Kassindja, 139 was a young woman 140 from Togo who sought
asylum in the U.S. to protect herself from being forced to submit to her
tribe's practice of female genital mutilation (FGM,) a practice of injuring
and often permanently maiming the genitals, imposed upon all female
members either in childhood or adolescence for the purposes of carrying
out cultural beliefs about women's sexuality. Ms. Kassindja had
successfully escaped the practice through the protection of her influential
father. Upon his death she fell under the care of her aunt who forced Ms.
Kassindja into a polygamous marriage and, in preparation for it, was also
making plans to force her to undergo FGM before the marriage was to be
consummated.
The BIA found that the practice of FGM constituted persecution, thereby
satisfying the first component of the legal analysis of the basis for a grant
of asylum. In order to satisfy the second phase of the legal inquiry, the
persecution had to be tied to one of the five categories specified in section
101(a)(42)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.' 4' The BIA found,
therefore, that the persecution was "on account of' her membership in the
"particular social group" of "young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu
Tribe who have not had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, and who oppose
the practice.'
142
In this case, the BIA arrived at a fair legal result, but only by way of the
most circuitous analytic route. Despite the fact that FGM is a gender-
specific practice imposed upon all girls in the society precisely because
they are female, the BIA did not find that the group subject to persecution
was comprised of the tribe's female members. Had it done so, it would
have foregrounded gender as the obviously salient characteristic of identity
that is the basis upon which FGM was inflicted. This kind of more
expansive analysis would have recognized FGM as a gender-specific form
of persecution and led to a precedent in which gender alone was recognized
138. This case was also analyzed in Randall, HWLJ, and this discussion is adapted
from that article.
139. Ms. Kassindja's name was misspelled in the decision which is, incorrectly,
identified as Kasinga. For a discussion of this, see Musalo, Protecting Victims, supra
note 10, at 135.
140. In reAcosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. at 358 (stating that she was only 19 years old at
the time of her application, and 17 years old at the time that the events occurred).
141. Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A) (1994).
142. In re Kasinga, 21 1.& N. Dec. at 368.
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as the basis of the persecuted social group. Instead, the BIA focused on the
fact that the applicant had escaped the practice, situating her within the far
narrower group of women "having intact genitalia"'' 43 who also oppose the
imposition of FGM. This is more than a matter of semantics. Instead, it is
an issue of finding legal categories that can most appropriately
accommodate the facts, one of which is that the persecution (in the form of
FGM) from which Kassindja sought escape, is a gender-specific practice.
Indeed, FGM is a practice of gender inequality.
The definition of "particular social group" in Kasinga, while
representing a positive legal development in the U.S. context, is
nevertheless one that shies away from grappling with gender as a category
in its own right. By linking the persecution Kassindja experienced to her
opposition to and escape from the practice and artificially constructing this
status to comprise membership in a "particular social group" defined by her
tribal membership, her gender and her "genitally intact" status, the BIA's
analysis of the applicant's situation has it backwards. The BIA failed to
acknowledge that the persecution existed precisely "on account of' her
gender.
Some Key Cases and their Significance
This problematic trend has continued to unfold in the adjudication of key
cases since this important but flawed decision. An example par excellence
of the protracted tortured and convoluted route an asylum claim made by a
woman fleeing gender persecution can take in the U.S. is found in In re R-
A-.' nn Even more problematic than the ever narrowing construction of
"particular social groups" are cases, such as R-A-, in which courts have
simply refused to recognize gender as forming even part of the group
identity, leading to denial of asylum. While the case was ultimately
favorably decided on December 10th, 2009 when she was finally granted
asylum in the U.S., the applicant, Ms. Alvarado, a Guatemalan woman who
had been subjected to a decade of extreme physical and sexual abuse from
her husband and received no police protection, underwent a 14-year
odyssey through the U.S. refugee process to get relief in the form of a grant
of asylum.
Initially the BIA denied asylum to Ms. Alvarado even though the severe
physical and sexual abuse she suffered was violence that the Board had no
trouble identifying as constituting persecution. 145 The application failed at
143. Id. at 366.
144. In re R-A-, 22 1. & N. Dec. 906, 907 (BIA 1999), vacated22 1. & N. Dec. 906
(A.G. 2001).
145. Id. at 927. The decision was based on a split, 10-5 en banc decision which
included a vigorous dissent critiquing the shortcomings of the majority's analysis and
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this stage, however, because, among other reasons, 146 the BIA found that
her persecution was not "on account of' a cognizable ground, rejecting her
claim that the relevant social group was "Guatemalan women who have
been involved intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who believe
that women are to live under male domination."'' 47 This decision generated
a storm of protest and academic criticism, 148 and was vacated by order of
the Attorney General, on January 19, 2001,149 and was remanded to the
BIA for rehearing after the expected final publication of new regulations
pertaining to gender asylum claims. 50
Following the BIA decision and the critical reactions to it, Ms.
Alvarado's case required further years of intervention and waffling by three
Attorney Generals - Janet Reno, John Aschcroft and Michael Mukasey -
before reaching a final disposition.151 It was finally settled late in 2009
when the immigration judge issued a summary judgmentgranting
asylum.112 Critical to the positive outcome in the R-A- case was the brief
ultimate finding.
146. The Board also engaged in an analysis of the perpetrator's motivation for the
abuse, arguing that he was inclined to assault and inflict harm only on the applicant,
and not on a larger social group of which she claimed to be a member, as if this were
somehow relevant to the legitimacy of her asylum application. The Board also seemed
to suggest that the government of Guatemala was capable of protecting the applicant
from domestic violence, thereby the negating the absence of state protection for this
applicant, and, as some commentators have argued, ignoring the evidence. See
Deborah E. Anker, et al, Defining "Particular Social Group" In Terms of Gender: The
Shah Decision and U.S. Law 76 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1005, 1006 (1999).
147. The Board also rejected the enumerated ground of "political opinion" for this
applicant. In re R-A- 22 1 & N Dec. at 926.
148. See, e.g., Anker, supra note 147, at 1006; Sharon Donovan, No Where to
Run.... Nowhere to Hide: Battered Women Seeking Asylum in the United States Find
Protection Hard to Come By: Matter of R- A-, 11 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 301, 303
(2001); Fredric N. Tulsky, Asylum Denied for Abused Girl; Ruling of Appeals Panel is
Assailed, WASH. POST, July 4, 1999, at A03; Karen Musalo, Matter of R-A: An Analysis
of the Decision and its Implications, 76 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1177, 1185 (1999).
149. Matter of R-A-, U.C. HASTINGS CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUD.,
http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/our-work/matter-r (last visited Apr. 24, 2015).
150. These rules expressly state that gender can form the basis of a particular social
group, and are also intended to aid assessments of domestic violence refugee claims,
removing the barriers enacted by the In re R- A- decision.
151. See generally Barbara Barreno, In Search of Guidance: An Examination of
Past, Present, and Future Adjudications of Domestic Violence Asylum Claims, 64
VAND. L. REV. 225, 225-69 (2011) (summarizing and analyzing the sorry trajectory of
this woman's asylum application; see also Musalo, Gender Asylum, supra note 10, at
58-60; Matter of R-A-, supra note 150.
152. See Musalo, Two Women, supra note 12, at 74; see also Matter of R-A-, supra
note 150.
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filed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in another case
involving a refugee claim to escape domestic violence, known as Matter of
L.R.
In the brief relating to L.R., the DHS provided a roadmap for the legal
requirements of eligibility for asylum claims based on membership in a
"particular social group" and also importantly recognized that domestic
violence can be a basis for a successful refugee claim.153 Ms. L.R. suffered
many years of brutal physical and sexual violence and had 3 children, each
of whom was conceived because of marital rape perpetrated by her
common law husband. He also tried to kill her and prevented her from
seeing her children. Ms. L.R. fled to the U.S. with her 3 children in 2004.
While there were various procedural issues related to her claim for
asylum, for the purposes of this analysis of great significance was the
immigration judges' simultaneous acknowledgment that the severe physical
and sexual abuse perpetrated by her common law husband amounted to
persecution combined with the simultaneous refusal to recognize that this
very persecution was on account of a protected ground - her gender. Ms.
L.R.'s lawyers' claim was that the "particular social group" of which she
was a member was defined by gender and her inability to leave a violent
abuser. 154
The immigration judge, however, astonishingly found that Ms. L.R.'s
abuser was simply a "violent man," as if he randomly inflicted violence on
anyone around him, and as if this kind of violence was an entirely
anomalous or exceptional event in women's lives. On this judicial view, it
wasn't Ms. L.R.'s gender or relationship status which was the basis of the
violent persecution she suffered at her spouse's hands. In this decision the
judge both rendered the patterned nature of gendered violence invisible,
and implied that sexual and physical violence in an intimate heterosexual
relationship is not part of the gendered problem of domestic violence but
instead a kind of untargeted, random and haphazard event. This judgment
is clearly, to say the least, out of sync with not only the decades of research
demonstrating the gendered nature of domestic violence but also out of line
with now uncontroversial international recognition that domestic violence
is a human rights violation which affects women the world over.
153. See Matter of L-R-, U.C. HASTINGS CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUD.,
http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/our-work/matter-l-r (last visited Apr. 24, 2015).
154. This characterization of women who are terrorized in intimate relationships in
a social context of state failures and the absence of police protection as "unable to
leave," is in and of itself highly problematic as it casts the lens on the victim instead of
on her social context. But it is no doubt necessitated by the requirements of fitting into
a cognizable social group for the purposes of a refugee claim when gender persecution
is not recognized as its own distinct form of human rights violation.
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This problematic decision, however, was overturned and Ms. L.R., after
initially being rejected, was ultimately granted asylum in 2010 after her
case traversed another long legal journey from the initial IJ to the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) and then back again to Immigration Court.'55
The critical intervention in the final hearing seemed to be the DHS brief
filed in 2009 in which the Department's current position was outlined on
whether victims of domestic violence, in circumstances like those faced by





While recognizing that domestic violence may be the basis for an asylum
claim, the DHS brief cautions that not "every victim of domestic violence
is eligible for asylum"'' 57 and stresses that a range of requirements must be
met including a relatively rigorous evidentiary record (particularly
pertaining to the country conditions and lack of state protection). However,
the Brief is significant for stating that domestic violence victims can, for
the purposes of asylum claims, form a particular social group and relaxes
the requirements for meeting the requirements of "social visibility" and
"particularity" with regard to women subjected to domestic violence. The
Brief indicates that a woman who can show she was in domestic
relationship with a spouse who believes he has a right to inflict violence in
a segment of society "that will not be accorded protection from harm
inflicted by a domestic partner"'158 can meet the "social visibility"
requirement of the membership in a "particular social group" ground for
persecution. Commentators have noted that the analysis in the DHS brief,
while significant for cases involving domestic violence, has positive
implications for gender-based claims more generally. "The brief takes the
position that gender and status in a relationship, status in the family, and/or
status in society can define a social group that fulfills all the current social
group requirements, and that these characteristics may be one central
reason for gender-based persecution.
1 59
155. See Musalo, Gender Asylum, supra note 10, at 60-62; see also Matter of L-R-,
supra note 154; see also Jessica Marsden, Note, Domestic Violence Asylum After
Matter of L-R-, 123 YALE L.J. 2512, 2528-30 (2014).
156. Department of Homeland Security's Supplemental Brief at 4-5, In re L-R-,
[redacted] (Apr. 13, 2009) [hereinafter DHS 2009 Brief], available at
http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/Matter of LR DHSBrief 4_13 2009.pdf
Interestingly, the DHS brief originally filed in April 2008, was in full support of
immigration judge's reasons for denying asylum; see also Musalo, Gender Asylum,
supra note 10, at 61-62.
157. DHS 2009 Brief, supra note 157, at 12.
158. Id. at 18.
159. Matter of L-R-, supra note 154.
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The Bbrief recommends two possible ways of accommodating Ms.
L.R.'s claim within membership within a particular social group. The first
recommended characterization is "Mexican women in domestic
relationships who are unable to leave," and the second is "Mexican women
who are viewed as property by virtue of their positions within a domestic
relationship."'' 60 Clearly these characterizations are superior to the view of
the IJ who failed to recognize any gender-defined group to which Ms. L.R.
belonged and who failed to appreciate the nexus between her claim and any
enumerated ground of persecution. Yet the DHS brief nevertheless fails to
grasp the bigger issue which is that domestic violence is itself a form of
gender persecution and that her gender is the basis on which she was
violated sexually and physically by her violent common law husband. Her
gender was not a coincidence or irrelevant detail, but fundamental to the
experience of domestic violence.
Particularizing Social Groups: Modifying Gender
Despite the positive elements of the DHS brief, it is not hard law but is,
like the Canadian Guidelines, an interpretive guide only. Many of the
formidable barriers to women's gender persecution claims for asylum in
the United States continue to flow from the absence of gender as an
enumerated ground of persecution, and result in the increasingly
convoluted attempts to fit these claims into various permutations of
"particular social groups." Furthermore, to fit a gender persecution claim
into the membership in a "particular social group" analysis, there is now
troubling precedent imposing onerous further requirements that must be
met.161 It was in Matter of C-A- 162 that the court found that, in order to
establish a recognized social group, two additional necessary criteria are
that the group must have "social visibility" and be characterized by
"particularity." These two further requirements were upheld in the 2008
decision, Matter of S-E-G.163
"Social visibility" refers to the visibility of the group within the broader
society and "particularity" specifies that the group cannot be too populous
or too diverse. But as Karen Musalo points out, decision makers have been
[particularly] "confounded by what is meant by 'social visibility."",164
160. DHS 2009 Brief, supra note 157, at 14.
161. See generally Fatma E. Marouf, The Emerging Importance of "Social
Visibility" in Defining a Particular Social Group and Its Potential Impact on Asylum
Claims Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender, 27 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 47, 79
(2008).
162. In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (B.I.A. 2006).
163. In re S-E-G-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 579, 582 (B.I.A. 2008).
164. Musalo, Gender Asylum, supra note 11, at 60.
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These additional requirements, then, erect even more definitional obstacles
to women's gender-based refugee claims and also represent a problematic
retreat from the recognition in the important 1985 decision in Matter of
Acosta, that sex can be recognized as an immutable and common
characteristic to a group of individuals for the purposes of membership in a
"particular social group." Furthermore, they do not resolve the problem of
increasingly specific sub-classifications of women in "particular social
groups," Indeed, they compound it.
To illustrate this point, U.S. decision makers have defined various
"particular social groups" as "women who have been sold into marriage
(whether or not that marriage has yet taken place) and who live in a part of
China where forced marriages are considered valid and enforceable,'
165
females "born into the Tukulor-Fulani tribe in Senegal,' 66 "women of the
Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had FGM, as practiced by that
tribe, and who oppose the practice"'' 67 as the relevant social group in a
successful asylum claim and "Guatemalan women who have been involved
intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who believe that women are
to live under male domination."' 168 In Aguirre-Cervantes v. INS, a young
woman from Mexico, was granted relief on the basis that the persecution
she suffered (extreme physical abuse perpetrated by her father) was "on
account of' her membership of the "particular social group" identified as
her own family of origin. 169  In Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, another
petitioner from Mexico was granted asylum on the basis of persecution on
account of the very specific sexual identity described as homosexual men
with female identities. 70 In Matter of A-N-, a woman who fled abuse from
her husband in Jordan was granted asylum on the basis that she was part of
the "particular social group" comprising "married, educated, career-
oriented" Jordanian women, indicating a recognition of the gender-based
persecution but with a series of major qualifications attached to narrow the
ground significantly.' 7' In Sarhan v. Holder, the "particular social group"
was described as "women in Jordan who have (allegedly) flouted
165. Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, 70 (2d Cir. 2006).
166. Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1191 (10th Cir. 2005).
167. In reKasinga, 21 1. & N. Dec. 357, 358 (BIA 1996).
168. See In re R-A.-, 22 1. & N. Dec. 906, 920 (B.1.A. 1999), vacated, 22 1. & N.
Dec. 906 (A.G. 2001) (noting the relevant social group identified in a claim which was
initially denied though later allowed).
169. Aguirre-Cervantes v. INS, 242 F. 3d 1169, 1178 (9th Cir. 2001).
170. Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F. 3d 1084, 1095-96 (9th Cir. 2000).
171. IJ Grants Asylum in Gender Violence Case, 78 Interpreter Releases 409, 412
(2001) (discussing In re A-N-, A73 603 840 (IJ Dec. 22, 2000) (Philadelphia, Pa.)
(Grussendorf, 1J)).
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repressive moral norms, and thus who face a high risk of honor killing."' 172
An important study examining 206 asylum claims made by women who
experienced domestic violence and sought refuge in the United States
found that approximately one third of the cases (63 of 206) were denied,
and most commonly on the basis of a "lack of cognizable social group."'
' 73
In the author's words, despite some progress in decision making about
domestic violence based gender persecution asylum claims in the U.S., the
absence of applicable norms and the shifting policy positions on the part of
DHS have continued to produce contradictory and arbitrary outcomes in
domestic violence asylum cases." The main impediment to consistent and
fair decision making in these domestic violence based asylum claims is the
failure to grasp domestic violence as a gendered harm; too often it is
viewed in a decontextualized way by DHS decision makers who tend to
characterize it as a "personal dispute."'' 74  This finding echoes the
comparative analysis Efrat Arbel undertook of the gender persecution cases
appealed to the Federal Court of Canada, where the gendered harms of
FGM and forced sterilization were more consistently grasped as gender-
based persecutions than were the claims based on domestic violence.
175
Missing the gendered nature of domestic violence, while problematic on
multiple levels of analysis, is particularly troubling in exacerbating the
barriers which already impede the recognition of women's claims as fitting
into a "particular social group."
The failure to recognize gender alone as forming the basis of the group's
identity compromises advances made in recognizing domestic violence as a
form of gender persecution. In the recently released and precedential
decision, in Matter of A-R-C-G-, the BIA confirmed that women seeking
asylum to escape domestic violence can be recognized as members of a
"particular social group." This landmark decision resolves nearly two
decades of legal uncertainty about whether or not women fleeing domestic
violence were entitled to asylum protection in the U.S. The case has been
sent back to an immigration judge to decide on the evidence whether the
asylum requirements are met with regard to the state's failure to protect
Ms. C-G-. But the decision's precedential value lies in the recognition that
the persecution she suffered, described by the BIA as "repugnant abuse,"'
176
was tied to her membership in the "particular social group" formed by
172. Sarhan v. Holder, 658 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2011).
173. Blaine Bookey, Domestic Violence as a Basis for Asylum: An Analysis of 206
Case Outcomes in the United States from 1994 to 2012, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J.
107, 121 (2013).
174. See id. at 147.
175. See Arbel, supra note 43, at 748.
176. In re A-R-C-G-, 26 1. & N. Dec. 388, 389 (BIA 2014).
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"married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship"
and that domestic violence can form the basis for an asylum claim.
In In re A-R-C-G-, the BIA confirms its holding from Matter of W-G-R-
and Matter of M-E-V-G- that an asylum seeker must demonstrate their
membership in a "particular social group" which is "(1) composed of
members who share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with
particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society in question."' 77
Gender is identified as an "immutable characteristic" of the group to which
Ms. C-G- belongs, but it is not gender unmodified. Her marital status and
her "inability" to leave the relationship are the other elements defining the
group. This decision is important for its recognition of domestic violence
as a basis for an asylum claim. Yet the legal analysis in the decision does
not surmount the definitional problems surrounding categorizations of
"particular social group" membership and the difficulty recognizing gender
alone as providing the nexus to the persecution.
It is perhaps no coincidence that the ongoing judicial construction of
increasingly particular versions of what constitutes a "particular social
group" in U.S. refugee law fits neatly with what is arguably a radically
individualized liberal ethos, infusing much of U.S. law and American
politics more generally. Recognition of large social groups situated in
structured relationships of inequality - and none is larger than that
constituted by gender - is antithetical to seeing the decontextualized and
unsituated individual as the fundamental unit of analysis, as is so central to
the liberal political tradition. Clearly a much-needed correction to this in
the context of refugee law is the statutory recognition of gender as meeting
the nexus requirement in the definition of refugee.' 78
HOLDING BACK THE FLOODGATES: ALARMIST ARGUMENTS ABOUT MASS
REFUGEE CLAIMS IF GENDER IS RECOGNIZED AS A GROUND OF
PERSECUTION
The official documents and interpretive Guidelines of major refugee-
receiving countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United
States all recognize that persecution can take gender specific forms, just as
the International Convention on Refugees recognizes that persecution takes
religious, political and racialized (among other) forms. Why then, is there
the persistent refusal to recognize gender as its own ground of persecution?
177. Id. at 392.
178 For analyses of this important decision and its implications see, Lauren Kostes,
Domestic violence and American Asylum Law: The Complicated and Convoluted Road
Post Matter ofARCG. CONN. J. INT'L L 30 (2015): 211-241; Musalo, Karen Musalo,
Personal Violence, Public Matter: Evolving Standards in Gender-Based Asylum Law.
HARVARD INTERNATIONAL REVIEW, 36, no. 2 (2014): 45.
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Why must gender-based persecution - unlike other forms of human rights
violations, which are recognized as historical and contemporary patterns of
oppression rising to the level of persecution warranting state protection -
be arduously fit into ever more context-specific and distinctly-defined
"particular social group" categories? How can this exclusion of gender be
justified?
Lurking beneath the concern about enumerating gender as a ground of
persecution in the definition of refugee is a concern about the size of the
group and a fear that too many of the world's downtrodden women will
rush the gates of the more prosperous countries of the developed world
seeking asylum there. Recognizing gender as an enumerated ground of
persecution is therefore seen by some as unleashing the specter of hordes of
prospective claimants seeking asylum simply by virtue of their membership
in a social category that is seen as being far too large. 
79
Some U.S. refugee decisions have been explicit in expressing the
concern that gender is an over-broad category on which to define a social
group. 18 For example, Circuit Judge Hartz, writing for the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals in a case involving a woman's claim for asylum based on
FGM, opined "[t]here may be understandable concern in using gender as a
group-defining characteristic. One may be reluctant to permit, for example,
half a nation's residents to obtain asylum on the ground that women are
persecuted there. 18'
But the concern about "half a nation's residents" seeking asylum
elsewhere entirely misses the very point of asylum law and misunderstands
its highly individualized nature. As Baroness Hale patiently explains:
Not all persecution gives rise to a valid asylum claim. Very bad things
happen to a great many people but the international community has not
committed itself to giving them all a safe haven. People fleeing national
and international wars, famine or other natural disasters are referred to as
refugees, and offered humanitarian aid by the international community,
but they do not generally fall within the definition in the 1951
Convention. Asylum can only be claimed by people who have a well-
founded fear of persecution "for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion". 1
82
Indeed, the interpretive documents of the refugee-receiving countries
179. See Musalo, Protecting Victims, supra note 10, at 120.
180. See Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1471, 1576-1577 (9th Cir. 1987); Safaie
v. INS, 25 F.3d 636, 640 (8th Cir. 1994).
181. Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F. 3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2005).
182. Fornah v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2006] UKHL 46, [97] (U.K.).
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also address this concern about gender being too expansive a ground of
persecution. For example, the UK Guidelines assert the following:
The fact that a PSG may consist of large numbers of the female (or male)
population in the country concerned is irrelevant - race, religion,
nationality and political opinion are also characteristics that are shared
by large numbers of people.
183
It should also be pointed out that this classic fear of opening the
"floodgates" has not prohibited recognition in refugee law that other
enumerated grounds - such as race, religion, and nationality - necessarily
encompass huge populations. This is a fact also referenced in the Canadian
Guidelines.'84  Furthermore, the UNHCR guidelines on gender-related
persecution expressly emphasize that the size of a social group is not a
relevant criterion in its recognition. Using the size of the group of women
as a basis for refusing its recognition "has no basis in fact or reason, as the
other grounds are not bound by this question of size."'1
85
Most fundamentally, then, the "floodgates" concern misses the essential
nature of the refugee remedy, which is a highly individualized, case-by-
case one. Regardless of the fact that large numbers of people in the world
suffer oppression and persecution, asylum claims are made one at a time,
on an individual basis, and each individual claimant must pass procedural
and evidentiary hurdles and fit her petition into a well-structured legal
framework in order to make out her case.
Moreover, migration is rarely an easy process. Many refugee claimants
make arduous and sometimes life-threatening journeys to reach a country
where asylum can be claimed, a fact which is painfully evident in the
frequent media accounts of migrant deaths caused in treacherous water
crossings. 186 Women and children have been an increasing presence in
183. Gender Issues in the Asylum Claim, UNITED KINGDOM VISAS AND
IMMIGRATION 11 (2011), available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment-data/file/257386/
gender-issue-in-the-asylum.pdf.
184. Id. ("The fact that the particular social group consists of large numbers of the
female population in the country concerned is irrelevant - race, religion, nationality and
political opinion are also characteristics shared by large numbers of people.").
185. UNHCR, Guidelines, supra note 21, at 8.
186 1 In the first seven months of 2015 over 2000 migrants died trying to reach Europe
by crossing the Mediterranean, more than double the number who died in the same
time period the previous year. International Organization for Migration, Deadly
Milestone as Mediterranean Migrant Deaths Pass 2,000, 08/04/15,
https://www.iom.int/news/deadly-milestone-mediterranean-migrant-
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migrant flows in what the International Organization for Migration
describes as a "worrying trend," particularly with regard to the rise in the
number of women using dangerous routes.'
87
The IOM, a Geneva-based organization, for example, reports that 16,839
female migrants have arrived in Italy in 2014, more than double the 7,658
who arrived during the same period in 2013.188 A briefing paper by
Mddecins Sans Frontires (MSF), highlights the frequency with which
women migrants experience sexual violence both in their countries of
origin and also en route as they journey towards a country where they seek
asylum. Given these treacherous conditions and the formidable obstacles
facing migrants, it is hardly a legitimate concern that the floodgates will be
forced open by the recognition of gender as its own ground of persecution.
Claims for asylum based on gender, as is the case for other claims, only
stipulate the enumerated reason for the persecution in any individual case
by naming the ground on which it is based. It is certainly not the case that
legal definitions of who counts as a refugee render large segments of the
population eligible for asylum simply by virtue of membership in identified
groups. To the contrary, refugee law provides a necessarily patchwork,
individualized micro-level solution to complex macro-level social,
economic, and political problems in the world.
Beyond meeting the refugee definition the claimant must also prove a
failure of state protection, which in itself can in many cases be a major, if
not insurmountable, evidentiary burden.
deaths-pass-2000. See also the 2014 report of the International Organization for
Migration, Fatal Journeys: Tracking Lives Lost during Migration, which provides an
international overview of the perilous journeys of migration and resulting deaths.
187 William Lacy Swing, Desperate Women's Dangerous Moves, 03/08/14,
http://www.iom.int/oped/desperate-womens-dangerous-moves. See also
Emma Graham-Harrison, Women in Calais camps: 'I have to focus on how I can stay
alive' The Guardian, July 31st, 2015,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/31/women-in-calais-camps-i-have-to-
focus-on-how-i-can-stay-alive.
188 IOM Press Release, More Women Making Dangerous Mediterranean Crossing -
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OVERCOMING GENDER NEUTRALITY: WHY GENDER MUST BE LEGALLY
RECOGNIZED AS ITS OWN GROUND OF PERSECUTION
[T]he danger of confronting the universality of women's oppression lies
in the rejoinder that women are always and never refugees-always,
because they cannot confidently rely on state protection wherever they
live; and never, because there is no place to which they can flee. 189
That women can now seek asylum from gender-related persecution has
been described as "one of the most remarkable achievements in [our] legal
history." 190 Yet migrant women's claims for asylum when they flee from
one nation and seek refuge in another to escape the particular harms of
gender persecution, and the attempt to create legal spaces in which these
claims can be accommodated in major refugee receiving states such as
Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom, throw into stark relief
a complex set of legal, political and social issues. These include definitions
surrounding human rights, women's rights and legal recognition of what
constitutes a rights violation, the public/private split, the state's role in and
relationship to gender inequality and the socio-legal contexts of violence
against women more broadly. Furthermore, given that the majority of
refugees come from nations of the Global South, sometimes described as
the developing countries, 191 refugee claims and their reception in the
nations of the Global North - particularly the liberal democratic countries
of the West - inevitably evoke dominant narratives and representations of
cultural "others." Put differently, refugee law, policies and flows tend to be
deeply racialized.
In this wider context, there have clearly been some positive policy and
interpretive developments regarding gender persecution asylum claims in
the case law of the countries analysed here. In an unpublished decision in
the U.S., forced marriage was recognized as gender persecution, 92 and in
189. Macklin, supra note 48, at 271.
190. Sherene Razack, Domestic Violence as Gender Persecution: Policing the
Borders of Nation, Race, and Gender, 8 CAN. J. WOMEN & LAW 45, 47 (1995).
191. In this paper I use the North/South, First World/Third World, and East/West
dichotomies interchangeably. The language used to capture these differences between
nations of the so-called developed countries of the north and underdeveloped of the
south, is necessarily inadequate, but for the purposes of this paper these terms make the
necessary point.
192. See Refugee Women's Resource Project, Asylum Aid, Key Cases Relating to





American University Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 4 [2015], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol23/iss4/2
PARTICULARIZED SOCIAL GROUPS
Canada, domestic violence has consistently, in theory at least, been
recognized as gender persecution with a nexus to a convention ground. But
these successes, among others, do not ameliorate the larger and more
entrenched legal obstacles facing women refugees. As Edwards observes,
even the successful gender persecution cases
seem to remain exceptions despite over a decade of positive case law. In
a 2004 study of 41 European asylum systems, for example, it was found
that less than half had recognized sexual violence as a form of
persecution (41.5 per cent); over a third of countries (33 per cent) do not
accept persecution at the hands of non-state actors as falling within the
definition of a refugee in the 1951 Convention; and nearly two-thirds of
countries do not acknowledge failure to conform to social and cultural
mores as a basis for a claim to asylum (61 per cent). Moreover, just over
one-third of countries had recognized women or particular women as
members of PSG (36.5 per cent). Likewise, jurisprudence in the United
States has been at best muddled. 1
93
The 2002 UNHCR Guidelines concerning particular social groups
expressly acknowledged that "sex can properly be within the ambit of the
social group category."' 94 Moreover, the country guidelines also make the
connection between gender discrimination and gender persecution, a link
that is well supported in some of the case law. According to the Canadian
Guidelines, for example, persecution may, in some circumstances, "be the
same as severe discrimination on grounds of gender."' 195 Similarly, the UK
guidelines recognize that "discrimination may amount to persecution in
countries where serious legal, cultural, or social restrictions are placed
upon women."' 96 But these policy-guided interpretive spaces in refugee
law are insufficient to the task of recognizing gender adequately. As
Michelle Foster succinctly puts it, "one of the most pernicious difficulties
is the overwhelming reluctance of both advocates and decision-makers to
frame the relevant ... ["particular social group"] as simply 'women."1 97
As the examples in the case law illustrate, in an international context
where deep and structured gender inequalities are still pervasive the world
over, the Canadian Guidelines, British Guidelines and U.S.
193. Alice Edwards, Transitioning Gender: Feminist Engagement with
International Refugee Law and Policy 1950-2010, 29 REFUGEE SURV. Q., no. 2, 2010,
at 30.
194. Guidelines in International Protection No. 1, supra note 21.
195. Laviolette, supra note 10, at 176..
196. UNITED KINGDOM VISAS AND IMMIGRATION, supra note 96, at 3.
197. Foster, supra note 10, at 28.
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"Considerations" are all inadequate half-measures. They all fail to direct
decision makers to recognize that female gender status is itself constitutive
of membership in a particular social group. This would have been a
creative way of interpreting and filling the statutory gender gap in the
definition of a refugee. 198 All of the guidelines, however, fall short of the
interpretive strategy of indirectly finding gender itself to be a ground of
persecution by recognizing women as a social group, and by recognizing a
specific form of persecution based on the fact that of being women.
Instead, the Canadian Guidelines state that "what is relevant is evidence
that the particular social group suffers or fears to suffer severe
discrimination or harsh and inhuman treatment that is distinguished from
the situation of the general population, or from other women."' 99 In this
way, then, the Guidelines mandate the identification of particular groups of
women subject to persecution, particular groups of women whose
experiences are distinguished from that of other women.200 The Guidelines
themselves miss the essential point.
In November 2014, the United Nations CEDAW committee issued
General Recommendation No. 32 on the gender-related dimensions of
refugee status, asylum, nationality and statelessness of women. This
recommendation advances a range of practical measures to improve
protection of women's rights in the asylum process. 20  The
Recommendation urges that all of the UN Refugee Convention grounds
identifying the bases of persecution should be interpreted in a gender-
sensitive way. It further calls upon states to domestically recognise sex,
gender, and LGBT status as free-standing grounds for claiming asylum (in
particular see paragraphs 13, 30 and 38 of the Recommendation). Clearly
the Recommendation, which emerged from a long collaboration and work
of an expert committee, aims to address the silence on gender which exists
198. In the Canadian context, this interpretive strategy would recognize gender as a
ground of persecution without it actually having been enumerated as an independent
ground, a statutory amendment which would have to be undertaken legislatively and
which exceeds the authority of the IRB Chair.
199. Immigration and Refugee Board, Guidelines Issued by The Chairperson
Pursuant to Section 65(3) of The Immigration Act 279, 284 (1993) [emphasis in
original].
200. Id. Furthermore, with specific regard to domestic violence the Guidelines
stipulates that "a sub-group of women can be identified by reference to the fact of their
exposure or vulnerability ... to violence, including domestic violence, in an
environment that denies them protection."
201 UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW), General recommendation No, 32 on the gender-related dimensions of
refugee status, asylum, nationality and statelessness of women, 5 November
2014, CEDAW/C/GC/32, available at:
http://www.refworld.org/docid/54620fb54.html [accessed 21 August 2015]
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in the Refugee Convention and aims to do so, in part, by urging the explicit
identification of gender as its own independent ground. This is a legal
move which is long overdue.
CONCLUSION: GENDER, JUSTICE AND REFUGEE LAW
It is clearly the case that adding gender as an explicit ground in the
definition of a refugee is an insufficient solution to the multiple barriers
facing women seeking asylum based on gender persecution. As Anker
notes, adding gender to the enumerated grounds does not solve the problem
because
the obstacles to women's eligibility for refugee status lie not in legal
categories per se, but in the incomplete and gendered interpretation of
refugee law - the failure of decision-makers 'to acknowledge and
respond to the gendering of politics and of women's relationship to the
state.'
20 2
Anker's well-taken point that recognizing gender as a ground of
persecution is insufficient as a strategy does not, however, make it
unnecessary. Indeed, adding gender is one important interpretive and
legislative step towards a more complete and gendered interpretation and
application of refugee law.
Numerous scholars and other refugee law experts have called for
improvements in the interpretation of "particular social group."20 3 As one
commentator argues, "[t]he addition of 'gender' as a refugee category is a
moral and political imperative. It is also a realistic goal, given increased
international recognition of the particular dangers women refugees face.,
204
Adding gender as a basis for recognizing persecution in the definition of
"refugee" in Canada, the United Kingdom, and United States would align
asylum legislation in these countries more fully with the international
human rights instruments they have signed onto that identify and protect
women's human rights.20 5 If the question is how to do this, then, "the
answer, of course, lies.., in a broader principle, and the exaggerated focus
on sub-groups and identifying characteristics ... [leads] to the essential
202. Anker, supra note 12, at 51.
203. See generally Doyle, supra note 10, at 520-21.
204. Mattie L. Stevens, Reorganizing Gender-Specific Persecution: A Proposal to
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identifying factor being ignored, namely, women in context, that is, women
in social context.,
20 6
The fundamental problem with fitting gender persecution claims into the
"particular social group" approach is that there is no rationale for how the
sub-group within gender-as-a-group is to be defined. In Macklin's words,
"the Guidelines accept that ... gender may form the basis for [particular]
social group ascription, but they evade the important question of how to
circumscribe the group., 20 7 Women's refugee claims for asylum from
sexual violence then, have had to be found to rest on an ever-expanding,
yet paradoxically increasingly narrow set of categories of claimants-for
example, "Indian women subjected to physical violence from husbands," or
"Lebanese women subjected to sexual abuse by uncles," and so on. This
fruitless particularization misses the very crucial point of the analysis-that
sexual violence is itself a form of gender persecution and that it is gender
which is both the common denominator defining the social group and
which makes women the target of this form of persecution in the first place.
In fact, the very section of the Canadian Guidelines which stipulates that a
sub-group of women can be identified by being distinguished from other
women, is immediately followed by the assertion that "[t]hese women face
violence amounting to persecution, because of their particular vulnerability
as women in their societies...., 208 The Canadian Guidelines, therefore,
fail to follow through on the radicalism of the very insight they espouse.
So too do the guidelines of the United Kingdom, and the much lauded DHS
brief in L.R. doesn't even approach a meaningful recognition that gender is
the basis for many forms of persecution of women the world over.
Catharine MacKinnon has pointed out that most gendered violence was
simply out of view "when the laws of war, international humanitarian law,
and international human rights guarantees were framed., 20 9  While
significant legal developments have brought this violence into view,
refugee law in Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States, along
with other key refugee-receiving countries, requires significant further
reform to sharpen the focus and make delivery of meaningful legal
remedies more possible. The well-recognized and entrenched masculinist
bias in the definition of refugee and persecution can only begin to be
overcome by making gender a statutorily identified ground for persecution.
206. Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Judicial Reasoning and 'Social Group' after Islam and
Shah, 11 INT'LJ. REFUGEE L. 537, 537 (1999).
207. Macklin, supra note 48, at 245.
208. Immigration and Refugee Board, Guidelines Issued by The Chairperson
Pursuant to Section 65(3) of The Immigration Act 279, 284 (1993) [emphasis added].
209. Catharine MacKinnon, Women's September 1 I th: Rethinking the International
Law of Conflict, 47 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 1 (2006).
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If it is their status as women in a gender unequal society which renders
them vulnerable to gendered harms, for example, domestic violence at the
hands of their male intimates - exactly the point that feminist advocates
have been making for decades and a point already well recognized in
international human rights law - then it is gender itself which is the basis
for membership in a particular social group. Gender is the defining
characteristic that delimits the social group, and gender is the basis of the
persecution. An intra-group comparison to construct a sub-group of
particularly vulnerable women within the group of women as a whole is
superfluous, problematic, and impedes access to justice for women who are
most in need of it. And that is why refugee-receiving states like Canada,
the United States, and the United Kingdom, among others, must enumerate
gender as an independent and recognized ground of persecution for the
purposes of asylum law.
Recognizing gender as a basis of persecution is not in and of itself a
solution to all of the difficulties and interpretive obstacles facing women
fleeing gender persecution (or indeed refugees more generally). But it is an
essential move in the direction of delivering a more just and gender-
sensitive asylum process in the world's affluent and safer nations, those
which purport to offer persecuted people safe refuge and state protection.
As Baroness Hale has effectively and acerbically observed:
The world has woken up to the fact that women as a sex may be
persecuted in ways which are different from the ways in which men are
persecuted and that they may be persecuted because of the inferior status
accorded to their gender in their home society.
210
The governments of Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States
still need to be "woken up" to the fact that in the refugee law of their
countries, gender must be statutorily recognized as a ground of persecution
for the purposes of making a refugee claim. Fairness, justice, and women's
equal access to the law require it.
210. Fomah v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2006] UKHL 46, [86] (U.K.).
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